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CONSTITUTIONALITY OF COMPULSORY
CHEMICAL TESTS TO DETERMINE ALCOHOLIC
INTOXICATION
Bernard M. Mamet*
(In a previous issue of this Journal (September-October, 1944)
appeared a timely article by Dr. Harger on the subject of chemical
tests for intoxication. In the article the tests were described and values
noted with particular reference to the problem of the drinking driver
and pedestrian. Now, in the following article, Mr. Mamet discusses
constitutional issues involved in the use of chemical tests and suggests
means by which such tests can be taken without the consent of the person
involved. The author, a senior law student in Northwestern University
Law School, is Editor-in-Chief of the Illinois Law Review.-EDrroR.)
Alcoholic intoxication is a serious factor contributing to
traffic accidents. Although there are no completely accurate
statistics available' regarding the relationship of alcohol to
automobile accidents, records indicate that alcohol plays a ma-
jor role in traffic safety problems.2 As yet, legislation, court
procedure, and public opinion have not been developed suffi-
ciently so as to enable traffic and safety officers to adequately
cope with the situation.
It is, of course, unlawful in all states to drive a vehicle while
"intoxicated 3 or "under the influence 4 of alcohol. However,
definitions and interpretations of these terms are so inadequate
in many states, that generally it is difficult to obtain a convic-
tion unless a person is obviously inebriated to a high degree.
Inadequacy of the Customary Methods
In most communities general observations by police officers
and witnesses to an accident or traffic violation constitute the
only attempt at diagnosis. In a number of other localities the
police supplement their "general observations" with a "special
examination" which consists primarily of alleged neurological
tests designed to determine the muscular coordination of the
arrested person. A police surgeon or other physician may also
* The author is indebted to Professor Fred E. Inbau of the North-
western University School of Law for his valuable comments and the
suggestion of the approach taken in this writing.
This article will also appear in the November-December, 1945,
issue of the Illinois Law Review.
1 The unavailability of accurate information is due to the fact that
records, when compiled, are obtainable, for the most part, from accident
reports. The accuracy of these reports is dependent upon the system
the reporter uses in summarizing the information and the care taken by
the reporter in noting his observations. Often the system utilized and
the care given are not adequate.
2 See the 1937 to 1941 Reports of the Committee on Tests for Intoxi-
cation of the National Safety Council, hereafter cited as Committee Re-
port. See also, address delivered by Donald S. Berry of the National
Safety Council, Alcohol and Traffic, July 25, 1944.
3 Term used in six states.
4 Term used in forty-two states. No attempt will be made to attach
any particular significance to these terms or to differentiate between
them.
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be called upon in certain instances to conduct a clinical exam-
ination for the chief purpose of distinguishing general illness
from intoxication. Thus, whether or not one is intoxicated
is usually determined by noting his ability to walk and stand,
his speech, the odor of his breath, the color of his face, the tre-
mor of his hands, the condition of his eyes, and any unusual
acts which deviate from the accepted norm.
Obviously, such tests cannot be used as an accurate index of
intoxication; the reliability of them can be seriously chal-
lenged.5 For one thing, how many of the physical factors al-
legedly indicating impairment due to alcohol must be present?
Again, to what extent must they exist? Then, too, even assum-
ing that all the physical factors manifest alcoholic influence,
the effect observed or sensed may originate from another cause.6
The state is, therefore, confronted with the arduous task of
proving that .the impairment in driving was due to alcohol. In
most instances, the methods are, of necessity, haphazard. The
result is correspondingly seen in the enforcement of "drunken
driving" legislation. Inadequacy also exists in the protection
of the driver of the vehicle; the customary tests may appear to
denote alcoholic influence and the defendant, although free
from culpability, may be unable to exonerate himself.
Chemical Testing
This situation need not exist. A scientific method for de-
termining intoxication has been formulated.7 Chemical tests
can now be utilized to ascertain the presence and amount of
alcohol in the body fluids or breath of the arrested driver. These
tests indicate the percentage of alcohol in the body substance
5 See People v. Evans, 209 Ill. App. 75; 7 N.E. (2d) 912 (1937) for
an example of the type of testimony used in obtaining a conviction for
driving a motor vehicle on the highways while under the influence of
intoxicating liquors. The doctor testified that "the first thing he noticed
was a very strong smell, -or odor, of some kind of a stimulant on the de-
fendant's breath .... I had a conversation with him, and he did not
look exactly right for a sober man. The expression of his eyes, his ac-
tions and so on .... His eyes, more or less, squint up and there is a
peculiar glint in them. I don't know how to describe it, but this is so.
His eyes showed he had had some booze."
6 See, Harger, Some Practical Aspects of Chemical Tests for Intoxi-
cation (1944) 35 J. of Cr. L. & Crim. 202-4 for an excellent discussion
of this point.
7 For discussion of the chemical aspects of the tests see: Harger,
op. cit. supra note 6; Ladd and Gibson, The Medico-legal Aspects of the
Blood Test to Determine Intoxication (1939) 24 Iowa Law Review 191,
193-215: Southgate and Carter, Excretion of Alcohol in the Urine as a
Guide to Alcoholic Intoxication (1926) 1 Brit. Med. Jour. 463; Hol-
comb, Alcohol in Relation to Traffic Accidents (1938) 111 J. of Am.
Med. Ass'n. 1076; Heise, The Specificity of the Test for Alcohol in Body
Fluids (1934) 4 Am. J. Clin. Path. 182, and by the same author, Alcohol
and Automobile Accidents (1934) 103 Am. Med. Assn. Jour. 739; Heise
and Halporn, Medico-legal Aspects of Drunkenness (1932) 36 Pa. Med.
Jour. 190. See also, Committee Reports: 1937, p. 14; 1938, pgs. 14-18
(comparison of tests), pgs. 36-39 (bibliography); 1939, pgs. 22-23 (bib-
liography); 1940, pgs. 33-35 (bibliography).
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analyzed and from this percentage the extent or state of inebri-
ation at the time the test is administered can be calculated.
Whether the substance analyzed be blood, urine, or breath, the
result attained is expressed in terms of the percentage of alco-
hol in the blood.
The factor determining a person's intoxication, or the degree
of intoxication, at any given time is not the amount of alcohol
consumed or the "drinking capacity" of the person tested. It
is the amount of alcohol actually absorbed into the blood and
thereby conveyed to the brain. Experiments have proved that
certainly insofar as automobile driving is concerned, any per-
son with a blood alcohol concentration of .15% is intoxicated
and incompetent to drive safely; that many, but not all, persons
having a blood alcohol concentration ranging from .05% to
.15% are intoxicated and incompetent to drive safely;8 and
that practically all persons with a blood alcohol concentration
of .05 % or less are sober and unaffected to the extent of impair-
ing their driving ability.9 Thus, in one category the non-
drinking or temperate driver can be vindicated. In another,
tolerance, i.e., the particular capacity of an individual can be
considered. In a third, alcoholic influence can be determined
regardless of unusual tolerance.
The information furnished by this process is unaffected by
the various factors which may influence the reliability of the
other methods of obtaining evidence. Chemical tests- and the
interpretation of them are accurate and have been generally
accepted by the medical profession. 10 The value of the tests
in furnishing evidence to determine intoxication and deter
s The number dependent, of course, upon the approach to the greater
limit of .15%.
9 "1. If there was . .. five-hundredths per cent or less by weight
of alcohol in the defendant's blood, it shall be presumed that the defend-
ant was not under the influence of intoxicating liquor;
"2. If there was ... in excess of five-hundredths per cent but less
than fifteen-hundredths per cent by weight of alcohol in the defendant's
blood, such fact shall not give rise to any presumption that the defendant
was or was not under the influence of intoxicating liquor, but such fact
may be considered with other competent evidence in determining the
guilt or innocence of the defendant;
"3. If there was... fifteen-hundredths per cent or more by weight
of alcohol in the defendant's blood, it shall be presumed that the de-
fendant was under the influence of intoxicating liquor;
"4. The foregoing provisions of this subsection shall not be con-
strued as limiting the introduction of any other competent evidence
bearing upon the question whether or not the defendant was under the
influence of intoxicating liquor." These provisions were adopted as a
revision of § 54, Act V, Uniform Vehicle Code, at a meeting of the Com-
mittee on Uniform Traffic Laws and Ordinances, Natl Conference on
Street and Highway Safety, Oct. 12, 1944. No attempt will be made to
discuss the above provisions relating to "presumptions".
1 The American Medical Ass'n has accepted these tests as reliable
indices of the degree of intoxication. See, 1944 Report of the Committee
to Study Problems of Motor Vehicle Accidents, Am. Med. Ass'n. See
also note 7 supra.
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"drunken driving" has been realized by those communities
utilizing them. 1
Compulsory Aspect
Four states have legislation encompassing the use of evidence
obtained through chemical tests.1 These laws deal only with
the use and weight of the evidence when chemical tests havc
been made of body fluids or of the breath of suspected drivers.'3
As yet, no legislation has been passed which provides for the
compulsory taking of specimens. However, a bill has been
prepared for presentation to the United States Congress, which,
if passed, will require motorists in the District of Columbia, 4
charged with operating a vehicle while under the influence of
any intoxicating liquor, to submit to a chemical test to deter-
mine intoxication. 15
Insofar as the chemical test results are concerned, it is im-
material whether or not the test is made with the subject's
consent or by compulsion - the accuracy of the results is, of
course, unaffected. However, the average person accused of
being under the influence of alcohol will not, if he has been
drinking, submit to a test when he knows he is not required to
do so. Moreover, if the test is voluntary, and consent is neces-
sary, how and to whom must this permission be given? Who
will determine this, the judge or jury? Can an intoxicated
person consent?16 Although as yet these queries have not been
raised in any case, there is no doubt that as the tests become
used more widely the issue of "consent" will appear as a valu-
able defense mechanism. Therefore, if chemical tests for
alcoholic intoxication are to be employed to maximum advan-
tage, their use should not be dependent upon the arrested
driver's consent.
11 See the latest Committee Report.
12Indiana, Burns Rev. Stat. Ann., 1940, § 47-2003 (a); Maine Rev.
Stat., 1939, c. 29, § 88 as amended; Thompson, Laws of New York, Ve-
hide and Traffic Law, 1942 Supp., § 70 (5); Oregon Com. Laws Ann.,
1943 Supp., c. 8, § 115-318 a (enabling act which provides for use of evi-
dence obtained through chemical tests which are made in counties hav-
ing a population of 200,000 or more,)
'3 Ibid.
14"(e) Any person arrested in the District of Columbia on any
charge of operating a vehicle while under the influence of any intoxi-
cating liquor may be taken before one of the examiners ... and such
examiner is authorized to examine such person for evidence of being
under the influence of intoxicating liquor. As a part of this examination,
the examiner may take a specimen or specimens of such person's blood,
urine, and breath or any of them."
15 Wide publicity of such legislation will have a marked prophylac-
tic effect on those who drink and drive. The enforcement of the stat-
utes and the prosecution of yiolators will be expedited and scientific
evidence will be accessible.
16 For a discussion of the issue of corisent see, Ladd and Gibson,
op. cit. supra note 7 at 241-251.
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Constitutional Issue
In many respects, the administration of chemical tests does
not present legal problems different from those attending the
employment of the usual methods of examinations used by
officers. However, since the very nature of chemical tests
requires what may be termed an invasion of bodily security,
i.e., the extraction or use of body fluids or breath, the constitu-
tional privilege against self-incrimination naturally appears ap-
propriate to defense attorneys as the basis for objections to the
admissibility of such test results. 17 Can an accused person be
compelled to submit to an examination of this nature?
The reported cases dealing with the privilege in relation to
compulsory tests of the type proposed are not numerous. In
fact, the majority of them are enlightening only as to the ad-
missibility of such evidence and are not helpful in analyzing
the issue of self-incrimination. The courts find no difficulty in
admitting into evidence the results of tests voluntarily given.
One of the best discussions as to the value of the tests and the
admissibility of them is found in a civil case,' " where the court
states, in allowing the introduction of the evidence, that "It
appears to be the consensus of the medical profession that when
the blood alcohol concentrate of the driver of an automobile is
0.15% (by weight) such fact is conclusive evidence that the
driver is under the influence of alcohol."'19 Similar expositions
are found in criminal cases in Iowa,20 North Carolina,2 1 and
Massachusetts. 22  In all these cases the issue of compulsion was
not involved.
Most courts which have considered the compulsory aspect of
the test have held that the test was administered voluntarily-
that the defendant had consented. The first important case
dealing with this point was State v. Duguid.23 There the evi-
dence introduced at the trial indicated that the urine specimen
17 All states except Iowa and New Jersey have adopted the privilege
against self-incrimination by constitution and these two states have in-
corpcrated it into their statutes.
] Lawrence v. City of Los Angeles, 53 Calif. App. (2d) 6, 127 P.
(2d) 931 (1942).
19 A reproduction of a graphic illustration which appeared in the
1940 Report of the Committee on Tests for Intoxication showing the
relationship between alcohol in the blood and the degree of intoxication
is found in the opinion. See also, Kuroske v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 234
Wis. 394, 291 N.W. 384 (1940) and Richter v. Hoglund, 132 F. (2d) 748
(C.C.A. 5th, 1943). In both of these civil cases the court admitted
blood tests to determine intoxication. The only privilege the courts dis-
cuss is the physician-patient one. See also, Bednarika v. Bednarika, 18
N. J. Misc. 633, 16 A. (2d) 80 (1940).
2" State v. Morkid, 286 N.W. 412 (Iowa, 1939). The court recog-
nized the value of the blood test and admitted it into evidence. Compul-
sion was not involved.
21 State v. Cash, 219 N. Car. 818, 15 S. E. (2d) 277 (1941).
22 Commonwealth v. Capalbo, 308 Mass. 376, 32 N. E. (2d) 225
(1941).
23 53 Ariz. 276, 72 P. (2d) 435(1941).
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was given upon request. The court held that there had been
no compulsion and hence the testimony of the doctor analyzing
the results of the test was admissible. Consent to the test had
been given by failure to resist. Thus, the exclusionary rule
of the privilege against self-incrimination was eliminated. The
same result was attained in an Indiana case24 where the court
held that the accused had voluntarily submitted to the test and
he thereby waived the privilege. Similarly, the Florida court25
recently allowed the admission of a blood test where no com-
pulsion was shown.
In State v. Gatton,2 6 the refusal of the defendant to submit
to a blood test to determine intoxication was allowed to be
shown at the trial and the prosecutor was permitted to com-
ment upon this point in his argument to the jury. The court
in upholding the conviction stated: "We are unable to observe
any merit in the defendant's claim that the introduction of
such evidence violated his constitutional rights, and we believe,
and hold, that the constitutional inhibition against self-incrimi-
nation relates only to disclosures by utterance. No such dis-
closure was required of the defendant in the instant case."''z
Thus, the court appears to doubt that the privilege exists
under such circumstances. Despite the broad language of the
case it is conjectural whether the same result would have been
attained if the defendant had been compelled to submit to
the test.
Although it is apparent that most courts require that consent
be given, a few cases have upheld the tests where the person
did not submit to them on a purely voluntary basis. In State v.
Small,2 the court found consent where the defendant, after
being arrested, was taken to jail and subjected to a blood test.
The defendant agreed to take the test only after the doctor told
him that he was convinced that the defendant was intoxicated
and would so testify; that a blood test would either confirm or
disprove the doctor's testimony.? An even more promising
attitude is noted in the latest exposition on this point in Iowa.30
The admission of a blood test was affirmed over the objection
24 Spitler v. State, 221 Ind. 107, 46 N. E. (2d) 591 (1943).
25 Touchton v. State, 154 Fla. 547, 18 So. (2d) 752 (1944).
26 60 Ohio App. 192, 20 N.E. (2d) 265 (1938).
27See in this connection, State v. Benson, 230 Iowa 1168, 300 N.W.
275 (1941) where the court allowed the admission of the testimony of
the sheriff which showed the refusal of the defendant to submit to a
blood test, holding that this was a circumstance to be considered by the
jury. .
28 233 Iowa 1144, 11 N.W. (2d) 377. (1943).
29 See the first Iowa case State v. Morkid, supra note 20.
30 State v. Werling, - Iowa-, 13 N.W. (2d) 318 (1944). For the
Iowa cases up to 1942 see Ladd, Recent Legal Developments on Blood
Tests to Determine Intoxication (mimeograph material issued by the
Committee on Tests for Intoxication, Nat'l Safety Council, May 5, 1942).
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of the defendant who claimed that he submitted to the test be-
cause "he thought the law required him to." The court found
no duress present.
The most recent exposition on the admissibility of compul-
sory chemical tests has been tendered by the Supreme Court
of Oregon. The court, in the case of State v. Cram,30 a offers
a discussion of the cases involving chemical tests and the issue
of self-incrimination. The defendant was convicted of man-
slaughter while engaged in driving a vehicle "while under the
influence of intoxicating liquor." The automobile which the
defendant was driving capsized, rendering him unconscious, a
condition in which he remained for approximately forty-eight
hours. During this state of unconsciousness, a doctor, at the
request of the police, extracted a sample of blood. This blood
was later analyzed for the purpose of determining its alcoholic
content and the results of this analysis were admitted into evi-
dence over the defendant's plea of self incrimination.. The ma-
jority opinion, after illustrating that the privilege applies only
to "testimonial compulsions," held that the "defendant was
not deprived of any of his constitutional rights by the admis-
sion of the testimony. . . .He was not compelled to testify
against himself. Evidence of the result of the analysis of the
blood sample was not his testimony.... The blood sample was
obtained without the use of any process against him as a wit-
ness. He was not required to establish the authenticity, identity
or origin of the blood, those facts were proved by other wit-
nesses." The opinion compares the admissibility of fingerprints
procured under compulsion and various acts a defendant might
be required to do with that of the evidence under attack.
If the opinion were confined to the above statements, its
value would be greatly enhanced. However, the strong dicta
and the manner in which other cases are distinguished are mis-
leading and detract from its effectiveness. For example, as the
defendant "was not compelled to do anything" (evidently be-
cause he was unconscious) the court finds it unnecessary to
consider how far a court can go in requiring one to submit
to a blood test.3b "Here the blood has already been extracted;
defendant is not being called upon to submit to an examina-
tion." (Italics supplied.) Thus, the court emphasizes that they
are not being called upon to decide whether the accused may
be forced to submit to such a test and apparently the decision
can only be used as precedent in situations wherein blood is
taken from an unconscious person. Moreover, the majority be-
lieves that the compulsory aspect of the test is intricately con-
3oa--Ore.- , 160 P. (2d) 283 (reported Aug. 17, 1945).
30b This analysis was used to distinguish the Apodaca case, infra
note 31.
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nected with the constitutional provision against "illegal search
and seizure" 30c and the admissibility of evidence illegally ob-
tained. Although these issues were not urged by the defense,
the majority joins with the concurring opinion in a rather in-
volved, complicated and misleading analysis of these points.3°d
It appears, therefore, that had these defenses been raised the
results of the blood test would have been held to be inad-
missible.
Although the Cram case is valuable in support of the view
that the privilege against self-incrimination does not prevent
the taking of chemical tests to determine intoxication, the ex-
tent of the value of the opinion is conjectural. The dicta and
side issues portrayed unfortunately hamper its utility and affect
its vitality.
The Texas case of Apodaca v. State31 was the first one hold-
ing inadmissible the results of a chemical test to determine
alcoholic intoxication. The defendant was forced to submit
to a urine test. The compulsion element was clear. Two tests
were taken, the results of the first one being destroyed by the
defendant. The second specimen was given because he was "or-
dered" 'to do so. The court. gave its interpretation of the
historical origin of the privilege and believed that as long as
any compulsion, was present the prohibition against self-
incrimination was violated. The Texas courts, however, ap-
parently admit the chemical tests if consent is definitely given.a2
From the above summary discussion it appears clear that the
courts recognize the value of chemical tests and will admit
them. The only legal barrier that exists is that of allowing the
results of compulsory tests to be introduced into evidence. The
Apodaca33 dilemma of self-incrimination in Texas is definitely
an obstacle34 to the effective development and administration
:0c Thus, the court becomes involved in the problems discussed in
note 34 infra.3odThe dissenting justice believes the case falls within the same
category as those wherein force is exerted to obtain the blood tests. He
finds self-incrimination and appears to agree with the rest of the court
that the evidence was illegally obtained and that there was an "illegal
search and seizure."
31 140 Tex. Cr. App. 593, 146 S. W. (2d) 381 (1940).
3-1 See Halloway v. State, 146 Tex. Cr. App. 353, 175 S. W. (2d)
258 (1943) where the Apodaca case is distinguished because consent was
given (urine test). See also, Millican v. State, 143 Tex. Cr. App. 115,
157 S.W. (2d) 357 (1942) where the court, in admitting the results of
chemical tests, speaks of "observations".3 Supra note 31.
34 The case of State v. Weltha, 228 Iowa 519, 292 N.W. 148 (1940)
presented what the court thought was another constitutional restriction
against compulsory chemical tests. In that case the trial court's ruling
was reversed because of what the court claimed was an erroneous ad-
mission into evidence of the results of a blood test taken from an un-
conscious person not under arrest at the time. The court stated: "We
have here a situation where a volunteer, without express or implied as-
sent, intrudes himself into an operating room and takes from an uncon-
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of a proper formula for cleansing highways of the prodigious
hazard of alcoholic driving. The decisions that justify the result
reached because there was no compulsion are to a lesser degree
impeding the efficient administration of "drunken driving"
legislation. This is also true of the opinions of several state
attorney generals3 5 to the effect that the tests are A'iblative of
the privilege against self-incrimination.
Although some of the details concerning the English and
early American history of the privilege are obscure, it is per-
fectly clear that the primary purpose of the privilege was to put
an end to the practice of employing legal process to extract fron
a person's lips an admission of his guilt.36 It was not designed
to afford protection from compulsory physical examinations
conducted for the purpose of establishing identity or for ascer-
taining certain facts of a physical nature indicative of the guilt
scious patient a blood sample to be used to make or sustain possible
future criminal prosecution. We cannot bring ourselves to approve such
a course; we find no authority which requires us to do so". Thus, the
court spoke as if there were an illegal search and seizure. Even assum-
ing there was basis for such reasoning, the court did not have to dis-
cuss this point. The decision could simply have been put upon the
ground, which the court discusses, that the evidence was carelessly
handled and not properly traced up until the time it reached the expert
for analysis.
Actually, search and seizure was not involved. The one who obtained
the evidence was a private volunteer - not an officer of the law. How
then could the search and seizure clause apply? The attempt to extend
the search and seizure clauses of the states to the situation under dis-
cussion is untenable. This safeguard was designed to protect people's
homes and persons from being invaded without legitimate search war-
rants. This provision was never designed to extend beyond the privacy
of the home and the possessions of an individual. It does not prohibit
a chemical disclosure and is not applicable to compulsory tests to deter-
mine intoxication. See: Olmstead v. United States, 277 U. S. 438, 465
(1928); People v. Defore, 242 N. Y. 13, 150 N.E. 585 (1926), cert. de-
nied, Defore v. People of the State of New York, 270 U.'S. 657 (1926);
Ladd and Gibson, op. cit. supra note 7 at 215-218.
35 See the 1940 Committee Report, pgs. 21-22 for a brief discussion
of some of the opinions.
36 For a detailed discussion of the history of the privilege see, Inbau,
Self Incrimination-What Can an Accused Person be Compelled to Do?
(1937) 28 J. of Cr. L. & Crim. 261. See also, 8 Wigmore, Evidence
(3rd ed., 1940) § 2263: "Looking back at the history of the privilege
and the spirit by which its establishment came about, the object of the
protection seems clear. It is the employment of legal process to extract
from a person's own lips an admission of his guilt, which will thus take
the place of other evidence.
"Such too, is the inference from the policy of the privilege as a
defensible institution (ante § 2251); that is to say, it exists mainly in
order to stimulate the prosecution to a full and fair search for evidence
procurable by their own exertions, and to deter them from a lazy and
pernicious reliance upon the accused's testimony extracted by forces of
law.
"Such, finally, is the practical requirement that follows from the
necessity of recognizing other unquestioned methods of procuring evi-
dence ....
"In other words, it is not merely any and every compulsion that is
the kernel of the privilege, in history and in the constitutional defini-
tions, but testimonial compulsions."
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or innocence of the accused person.3 7 Moreover, the general
policy justifying the existence of the privilege at the present
time is to deter law enforcement officers "from a lazy and per-
nicious reliance upon the accused's confession" and "to stimu-
late the prosecution to a full and fair search -for evidence
procurable by its own exertions." 38
There are many appellate court decisions to the effect that
an accused person may be compelled to submit to an examina-
tion of his body for scars, marks, and wounds, and to the taking
of his fingerprints or his photograph; to place his foot in a print
at the scene of a crime for comparison purposes; to change
his wearing apparel or enact a crime for purposes of identifica-
tion.3 9 One court, in a case which involved a problem similar
to that regarding compulsory. examinations for intoxication,
held that an accused person's privilege against self-incrimina-
tion was not violated by his being forced to discharge from his
mouth some morphine which he had concealed there when
arrested for its unlawful possession. 40
The analogy between these various types of compulsory evi-
dence and the taking of a specimen of breath, blood, or urine
seems basically valid in support of the view that such a proced-
ure does not violate the privilege- against self-incrimination. 41
Certainly no other conclusion is acceptable under a proper
historical interpretation of the privilege.4
37 See, Holmes, J. in Holt v. United States, 218 U. S. 245 (1910):
... the prohibition of compelling a man in a criminal court to be a
witness against himself is a prohibition of the use of physical or moral
compulsion not to extort communications from him, not an exclusion
of his body as evidence when it may be material."38 Wigmore, op. cit. supra. note 36 at § 2263.
-9 For a complete discussion of the cases involving the privilege see,
Inbau, op. cit. supra note 36. See also, Ladd and Gibson, op. cit. supra
note 7 at 232-241.
40 United States v. Ong Siu Hong, 36 Phil. Is. 735 (1917). See also,
State v. McLaughlin, 138 La. 958, 70 So. 925 (1916) (court held that
scrapings underneath the fingernails of an accused may be removed for
analysis without violating the privilege).
41 See the very recent case of Green Lake County v. Domes,
Wis. -, 18 N.W. (2d) 348 (1945) where the defendant upon being
charged with violating a county ordinance by operating an automobile
while under the influence of liquor was compelled to take a physical ex-
amination. The court held that the admission into evidence of the tes-
timony of the doctor relating to the physical examination was proper.
It stated that even though the defendant was compelled to do this there
was no violation of the privilege, following the views of Holmes, Wig-
more and Inbau. That is, the privilege extends only to oral communinca-
tions. See also, McFarland v. United States, - F. (2d) - (App.
D. C., July 2, 1945) where the defendant was forced under military order
to submit to an examination for the purpose of discovering the deceased's
blood on his body.
42 "In so far as the privilege against self-incrimination is concerned
there seems to be no limit to the extent an accused person must tolerate
an invasion of his bodily security. There may be and are, of course,
other considerations which will impel a court to define certain limita-
tions. Nevertheless, there is no justification for invoking the privilege
against self-incrimination for this purpose. Other and more appropri-
ate legal principles are available." Inbau, op. cit. supra note 36.
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Legislative Intervention
However unsound the application of the privilege against
self-incrimination may be to the situation under discussion,
the supposition appears to be firmly entrenched by the dicta of
most courts that have been confronted with the problem of the
admissibility of chemical tests. It would be wishful thinking
to expect a general enlightened viewpoint in the near future.
However, this barrier is not insurmountable. The constitution-
ality of compulsory chemical tests can be upheld even though
the issue of self-incrimination is uppermost in the minds of the
courts. That is, let it be assumed that ordinarily it is a viola-
tion of the privilege to compel one to submit to a chemical test
to determine intoxication-that the privilege exists in such a
situation. Yet, the legislature can by an enactment remove all
doubt as to the legality of such tests and overcome the alleged
existence of the privilege. The theory is simple.
One can not dispute the fact that it is within the police power
of a state to regulate the use of highways for the protection of
the public.43  When the automobile first came into use, the
cases vehemently discussed whether the exercise of the use of
the highways by individuals was conditioned upon a mere privi-
lege which could be denied completely" or whether it was a
right which could not be absolutely taken away.
45
Viewing the use of the highways as a privilege it is said that
the legislature can exclude automobiles from the highways en-
tirely. If they can deny the privilege they can provide for the
conditions under which it can be exercised, or as the theory is
commonly denoted: "the greater includes the lesser." If a
condition be that one must submit to a chemical test, one in
accepting the grant of using the highways waives a personal
constitutional privilege. That is, the power to prohibit in-
cludes the power to impose conditions of use. If one uses the
highways, he assumes the conditions attached to the use. Thus,
he can be deemed to have waived his privilege against self-
incrimination, if such a privilege did exist - there being no
doubt that the privilege can be waived.
46
43 See, 1-2 Cyclopedia of Automobile Law (9th ed., 1932) P. 188,
note 15 and (1945 Supp.) p. 4.44 For example, see: State v. Cox, 91 N.H. 137, 16 A. (2d) 508
(1940); Goldberg v. Davenport, 211 Iowa 612, 232 N.W. 477 (1930).
45 Similarly see, Chicago Motor Coach Co. v. City of Chicago, 337
Ill. 200, 169 N.E. 22 (1929); Florida Motor Lines v. Ward, 120 Fla.
1105, 137 So. 163 (1931).
46 Sawyer v. United States, 202 U. S. 150 (1906) ; Powers v. United
States, 223 U. S. 303 (1912); Ingram v. United States, 5 F. (2d) 940
(C.C.A. 8th, 1925); United States v. Wetmore, 218 Fed. 227 (W.D. Pa.
1914) ; People v. Johnston, 228 N.Y. 332, 127 N.E. 186 (1920). See also,
8 Wigmore, Evidence (3rd ed., 1940) § 2275, p. 435 when in referring to
self-incrimination he states: "It has never been doubted that the privi-
lege like all privileges . . . is in itself waivable."
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The New York case of People v. RosenheimerV' was one of
the earliest expressions of the waiver of the privilege against
self-incrimination effectuated through the use of the automo-
bile. The defendant was indicted for violating a typical "hit
and run" statute which was being passed in all parts of the
country at that time. The act made it a felony for any one to
knowingly leave the site of an accident without stopping and
disclosing his name, address, and operator's license number.
The defendant attacked the constitutionality of the statute on
the ground that it violated a portion of the state constitution
which provided that no person shall "be compelled in any crim-
inal case to be a witness against himself" - the usual self-in-
crimination provision. The court in applying the above
enunciated theory found no difficulty in holding that the de-
fendant by use of the highways had waived his privilege against
self-incrimination. It saw no "violation of public policy or of
the principles of personal liberty to enact that, as a condition
of operating such a machine one must waive his constitutional
privilege."
Although the court refused to state whether or not the in-
formation required impaired the constitutional privilege, it
emphasized that the particular theory used in upholding the
legislation did not involve the consideration of the degrees of
self-incrimination. That is, no matter how self-incriminatory
the matter may be,-the privilege is capable of being waived by
the application of the principle that the "greater includes the
lesser."4 s
Similarly in California 49 and in New Hampshire5" "hit and
run" statutes have been upheld. The reasoning in these cases
is just as forceful as that found in 'the Rosenheimer case. The
courts speak in phrases of "privilege and not a right," "com-
plete denial of use of highways," "imposition of conditions,"
and "waiver." Financial responsibility laws5' and the closing
47 209 N.Y. 115, 102 N.E. 530 (1913).
4 8 The lone dissenting judge could not accept the fact that a waiver
could be effected in this manner. He thought the statute was an in-
fringement upon the rights of individuals prohibited by the constitution.
His reasoning has not been borne out by the later cases nor does it find
support in the earlier ones.
49 People v. Fodera, 33 Calif. App. 8, 164 Pac. 22 (1917) ; People v.
Diller, 24 Calif. App. 799, 142 Pac. 797 (1914).
SO State v. Corron, 73 N.H. 434, 62 AtI. 1044 (1905) ; State v. Ster-
rin, 78 N.H. 220, 98 Atl. 482 (1916).
51 In re Opinion of the Justices, 81 N.H. 566, 129 Atl. 117 (1925);
In re Opinion of the Justices, 251 Mass. 569, 147 N.E. 681 (1925) ("The
power to license imports the further power to withhold such license ex-
cept upon compliance with prescribed conditions. The power to regulate,
even to the extent of prohibition of motor vehicles from public ways,
includes the lesser power to grant the right to use public highways only
upon observance of prescribed conditions precedent.") ; Heart v. Fletcher,
53 N.Y.S. (2d) 369 (1945).
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of certain streets to traffic5 2 have been upheld upon the same
basis.
The doctrine of "privilege" 53 and the accompanying "waiver"
based on the power to exclude entirely can perhaps be chal-
lenged by those adhering to the view that, although the use of
automobiles can be regulated they cannot be kept off the high-
ways entirely, or viewed realistically, no attempt will be made
to prohibit them. Thus, the need for a second avenue of
analysis.
If another approach is followed, "waiver" need not be dis-
cussed, and it can be assumed that one has a "right" rather than
a "privilege" to use of the highways. The case of Ex Parte
Kneedler54 illustrates this view. There, the constitutionality
of astatute was involved which contained provisions identical
with those discussed in the Rosenheimer case; the same issue
was raised - self-incrimination. 55 Although the court used the
terms "privilege" and "right" interchangeably, it is apparent
that it believed that the use of automobiles could not be abso-
lutely prohibited from the highways. The decision does not
express the doctrine of waiver, but merely holds that the statute
is a simple police regulation applied to a "fit subject." It argues
that as a person operating a motor vehicle has not an "unre-
stricted right" in exercising the "privilege" granted by the
legislature, he "must take it subject to all proper restriction."
52 See Commonwealth v. Kingsbury, 199 Mass. 542, 85 N.E. 848
(1908).
53 See United States v. Mulligan, 268 Fed. 893 (N.D.N.Y. 1920) for
an excellent discussion of this theory. - See also, Wilson v. United States.
221 U. S. 361, 380-81 (1911). This theory has also been applied in cases
involving the displaying of license plates: People v. Schneider, 139 Mich.
673, 103 N.W. 172 (1905) ("It is merely a justifiable exercise of the
police power in the interest of the safety of the travelling public.");
People v. Scholplen, 137 N.Y.S. 675 (1912). It was also found applicable
in those cases which dealt with the requirement that trucks be weighed:
Commonwealth v. Abell, 275 Ky. 802, 122 S.W. 757 (1938) and in numer-
ous situations not relating to highway regulation: see the quotation from
the Kneedler case, infra, note 55.
54 243 Mo. 632, 147 S.W. 983 (1912) (Habeas Corpus proceeding-
the petitioner being held on a capias issued on an information under the
statute.)
55 The court offers a fine discussion of other fields which are regu-
lated: ". . . If this objection to the statute is valid, it may as well be
urged against the other provisions, which require the owner and chauf-
feur to register their names and number, and to display the number of
the vehicle in a conspicuous place thereon, thus giving evidence of iden-
tity, which is the obvious purpose of the provisions ... We have several
statutes which require persons to give information which would tend to
support possible subsequent charges, if introduced into evidence. Per-
sons in charge are required to report accidents in mines and factories.
Physicians must report deaths and their causes, giving their own names
and addresses. Druggists must show their prescription lists. Dealers
must deliver for inspection foods carried in stock. We held a law valid
which required a pawnbroker to exhibit to an officer his book, wherein
were registered articles received by him, against his objection based on
this same constitutional provision. We held this to be a mere police
regulation . .. ."
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The decision, in itself, is not decisive of the point under dis-
cussion, for the tenor of it is that actually the information re-
quired by the statute was not self-incriminating. Confusion is
added by the alternative use of the terms "privilege" and
"right." However, later cases have clarified the views ex-
pressed.56
In People v. Thompson,57 the court, under similar facts, held
that the "... use of automobiles on public highways is subject
to regulation under the police power .... And, under the police
power, if public welfare or public safety requires regulation
of the use of such property, the otherwise private right of un-
restricted use must yield to public exigency."5 Thus, the
proposition is that although one has a right to use the high-
ways, if the rights of the individual citizen conflict with the
paramount rights of the public at large, then the rights of one
must yield to those of many. That is, a police regulation is not
rendered invalid by the fact that it may incidentally affect some
privileges or even some rights guaranteed by the constitution.59
The doctrine of waiver is not involved. The situation is a
typical one of the balancing of the interest of an individual
against that of the community in general. The right to use the
highways must be exercised in the mode consistent with the
rights of others to protection. It is within the purview of the
states' police power to effectuate a balance of these interests
even though in so doing one may be compelled to give infor-
mation against himself. By the application of this theory, the
issue of self-incrimination can be conveniently disposed of by
simply recognizing the superior power of the sovereign.
56 For additional cases dealing with highway regulation see: Woods
v. State, 15 Ala. App. 251, 73 So. 129 (1916); Ule v. State, 208 Ind. 255,
194 N.E. 140 (1935); In re Jones, 130 Fla. 667, 178 So. 424 (1938);
Scott v. State, 90 Tex. Cr. App. 100, 233 S.W. 1097 (1921); State v.
Masters, 106 W. Va. 46, 144 S.E. 718 (1928). Contra: People v. Hoogy,
277 Mich. 578, 269 N.W. 605 (1936). No attempt was made to uphold
the legislation on the ground suggested in this writing. The court did
not take notice of the earlier Michigan case, People v. Thompson, infra
note 57. Similarly see, Rembrandt v. City of Chicago, 28 Ohio App. 4,
161 N.E. 364 (1927) where a statute required a full report to be made
in case of an automobile accident. Held: self-incrimination. Again, the
"waiver" or "reasonable regulation" aspects were not discussed.
57 259 Mich. 109, 242 N.W. 857 (1932). See also, Surtman et al. v.
Sect. of State, 309 Mich. 270, 15 N.W. (2d) 471 (1944) holding that the
amendment to the Motor Vehicle Financial Responsibility Act, requiring
motorists other than operators of vehicles owned by the public to file
with the Secretary of State reports of accidents is not unconstitutional
as violating the self-incrimination privilege. It merely cites the Thomp-
son case as controlling.
58 The court also accepted the "privilege and complete exclusion"
theory, thus using two grounds for supporting its holding. See also, in
this connection, State v. Razey, 129 Kan. 328, 282 Pac. 755 (1929) ; State
v. Masters, 106 W. Va. 46, 144 S.E. 718 (1928).
59 See: Reitz v. Mealey, 314 U. S. 33, 36 (1941); Haque v. C.I.O.,
307 U. S. 496 (1939); State v. Gibbes, 171 S. Car. 209, 172 S.E. 130
(1933); People v. Alterie, 356 Ill. 307, 190 N.E. 305 (1934) ; Schneider v.
State, 308 U. S. 147 (1939).
BERNARD M. MAMET
It is not necessary to discuss the variations in the degrees of
self-incrimination. Once it has been determined that the
highways are a fit subject for regulation, and the regulation is
reasonable, the amount of infringement upon a person's con-
stitutional privilege is immaterial - and this is so whether the
use of highways be called a "privilege" or a "restricted right";
whether or not automobiles can be excluded from the highways
completely."1
The propositions discussed above are not novel nor is their
use limited to situations where the issue of self-incrimination
is raised.1.2 The "non-resident" motorist statutes are a classic
example. Service of process upon the secretary of state or a
fictitious agent is not in keeping with the traditional view of
due process. Yet, these statutes are upheld under the policy
underlying the Kneedler and Rosenheimer cases: the need for
reasonable regulation. 3 The result is the same whether the
theory is articulated in terms of waiver or merely by recogniz-
ing the police power of the state.64
It is to be noted that compulsory tests do not present a ques-
tion which goes beyond the sphere of the state. There is no
federal constitutional issue involved. Although the fifth amend-
ment of the federal constitution contains a provision regarding
self-incrimination, it has no application to infringement by the
states. The fifth amendment prohibits certain action by the
federal government alone. It has definitely been held that self-
incrimination clause of the amendment is not included within
the fourteenth. "" Therefore, it is only the self-incrimination
provisions of the state constitutions and statutes that are appli-
60 See State v. Mayo, 106 Me. 62, 75 Atl. 295 (1909) where it is
stated that no constitutional guarantee is violated by such an exercise of
the police power. See also, Reitz v. Mealey, supra note 59 and the dis-
cussion in the Rosenheimer case, supra note 47.
61 See the quotation from the Kneedler case, supra note 55 and the
cases cited supra note 53.
A,2 Merchant's and Planter's Bank v. Bugman et al., 160 S. Car. 362,
91 S.E. 332 (1917) (Lien on automobile when any personal injury or
property damage occurred. Held not violative of due process.); State
v. Phillips, 107 Me. 249, 78 Atl. 283 (1910) (Prohibited automobiles from
passing over certain streets. Held no denial of equal protection of law
or of enjoying life, liberty etc.).
63 See Jones v. Paxton, 27 F. (2d) 364 (D.C. Minn. 1928); Grave v.
Rogers, 158 Md. 685, 149 Atl. 547 (1930); Shushereba v. Ames, 255
N.Y. 490, 175 N.E. 187 (1931); Smith v. Haughton, 206 N. Car. 587,
174 S.E. 506 (1934); State ex rel Cronkhite v. Belden, 193 Wis. 145, 211
N.W. 916 (1927); Pizzulti v. Wichter, 103 N.J. 130, 134 Atl. 727 (1926).
See also, Scott, Jurisdiction over Nonresident Motorists (1926) 39 Harv.
L. Rev. 563; Barry, Jurisdiction over Non-Residents (1927) 13 Va. L.
Rev. 175.
P4 See Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U. S. 252 (1927) ; Kane v. New Jersey,
242 U. S. 160 (1916).
S Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 79 (1908). See also, Ladd and
Gibson, op. cit. supra note 7 at 218-25.
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cable. The due process clause of the fourteenth amendment
is in no wise relevant.66
Thus, where the courts might fail or be reluctant to admit
into evidence the results of chemical tests obtained under com-
pulsion, the legislature, by the exercise of its police power, may
overcome the hesitation and remove all doubts as to the legality
of such evidence. The theory upholding such legislation need
not be stated in the acts themselves. However, in order to dis-
pel any future controversies the legislation might provide that
one in applying for his driver's license must consent to the
taking of these tests. The application might state that the ap-
plicant accepts the license subject to the conditions imposed by
the legislature.
It militates against reality to believe that the privilege against
incriminating oneself is applicable in compulsory tests to de-
termine intoxication. But, as has been indicated, the privilege
is thought to exist and there is little possibility that it will
disappear from the minds of the courts. The need for legisla-
tion embodying provisions relating to the compulsory taking
of chemical tests is evident. The manner in which this legisla-
tion caf be upheld is equally patent. One need not search too
long for authorities to substantiate its validity, nor is any dras-
tic manipulation of legal principles necessary.
66 Nor is it necessary to discuss the doctrine of "unconstitutional
conditions" for, in the main, this doctrine is found in situations wherein
the regulations imposed by the state are of direct concern to the federal
government-where a federal constitutional provision is violated. For
examples of these conditions, see: Merrill, Unconstitutional Conditions(1929) 77 Pa. L. Rev. 879; Oppenheim, Unconstitutional Conditions and
State Powers (1928) 26 Mich. L. Rev. 176; Hale, Unconstitutional Con-
ditions and Constitutional Rights (1935) 36 Col. L. Rev. 321; Comment
(1945) 39 Ill. L. Rev. 244.
